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1.1 Introduction
Privatization is at the top of the political agenda in Asia. In China, the
state sector has failed to wither and continues to consume a large amount
of state resources (Steinfeld 1998, 2000). In Korea, the state has acquired
substantial banking assets through bailout programs and now faces the
serious issue of how to dispose of these assets (Chopra et al. 2001). In
Malaysia, there is the beginning of a real discussion about how best to
manage the relationship between the state and previously state-owned en-
terprises (Gomez and Jomo 1998). Throughout Asia, strong interest is de-
veloping in whether further privatization will speed up the economic re-
covery and sustain growth.
The early enthusiasm for privatization, however, has worn oﬀ since the
1980s and there is a general feeling of caution. Recent experience, particu-
larly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, has demonstrated
that simply privatizing is often not enough. As a result, there is a new em-
phasis on various complementary measures, such as stimulating competi-
tion. These complementary measures are often quite distinct from privati-
zation itself and require separate political initiatives. In this paper we focus
on one important issue that has emerged over the past decade: corporate
governance of privatized ﬁrms.
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nomic Research.demonstrated weak performance and have frequently been “tunneled” by
their management. In the Czech Republic, management of newly priva-
tized ﬁrms conspired with the managers of investment funds to strip assets
and siphon oﬀcash ﬂow (Coﬀee 1999b). Belated attempts by the Czech au-
thorities to control this process have proved diﬃcult. The lesson from post-
communist countries is that eﬀective investor protection must accompany
privatization.
But how exactly should corporate governance be implemented? In par-
ticular, is it necessary or even helpful for the government to pass and en-
force laws or legal regulations? Or can the private sector achieve all its de-
sired outcomes simply by relying on private contracts, in which case all the
government needs to do is to ensure that such contracts are enforced?
Ronald Coase (1960) explained the conditions under which individuals
and private ﬁrms should be able to make contracts as they please. As long
as the enforcement costs of these contracts are nil, individuals do not need
statutory law or can ﬁnd ways to contract around the law. There remains
strong support in both law and economics for three important Coasian po-
sitions: law does not matter; law matters, but other institutions adapt to al-
low eﬃcient private contracts; and ﬁnally, while law matters and domestic
institutions cannot adapt enough, ﬁrms and individuals can write interna-
tional contracts that achieve eﬃciency.
Coasian arguments have had great inﬂuence on discussions about cor-
porate ﬁnance, and in this paper we focus on this literature, emphasizing
points that seem particularly relevant for thinking about privatization. In
the spirit of this general position, Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) argue
that ﬁrms wishing to raise external ﬁnance can commit themselves to treat
investors properly through a variety of mechanisms. Law may restrict the
scope of these mechanisms, but ﬁrms and investors can always reach eﬃ-
cient arrangements. If this view is taken to the extreme, all countries that
have a good judicial system should be able to achieve similar and eﬃcient
ﬁnancial arrangements for ﬁrms. In this view, all privatization needs to do
is to transfer property rights to private investors and the market will take
care of the rest.
Also in the Coasian spirit, Berglof and von Thadden (1999) argue that
civil-law countries in Europe have developed institutions that allow com-
panies to enter enforceable contracts with investors. In their view, law may
matter and have shortcomings, but the political process and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
actions can generate other ways of oﬀering eﬀective guarantees to in-
vestors—for example, by mandating certain forms of government inter-
vention or establishing a particular ownership structure and dividend pol-
icy. As a consequence, bringing U.S.-type institutions into Europe would
not be helpful and could even be disruptive. In this view, the arrangements
may diﬀer across countries, but in many cases ﬁrms should be able to ac-
cess external ﬁnance. The implication is that while privatization should be
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style investor protection in order to be eﬀective.
Even among the scholars who are convinced that legal rules matter, there
is a Coasian skepticism about whether changing rules can have large ef-
fects. Coﬀee (1999a, b) argues that while U.S. ﬁrms derive important advan-
tages from the U.S. legal system, other countries are not converging through
changing their rules, presumably because this is politically diﬃcult. In-
stead, there is a process of “functional” convergence, through which ﬁrms
choose to adopt U.S.-type private contracts with their investors—for ex-
ample, by issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). In this view, cor-
porate governance of privatized ﬁrms can be assured through the issue of
ADRs or through otherwise listing in a stock market with a high level of
investor protection.
These Coasian arguments are extremely powerful. However, they are re-
jected by the data. Recent research shows that the legal rules protecting in-
vestors matter in many ways, that other institutions cannot adapt suﬃ-
ciently, and that changing domestic legal rules can have a big impact. We
are also moving closer to a theoretical understanding of why exactly these
Coasian positions are not correct and what this implies for standard mod-
els of economics and ﬁnance. The implication is that unless privatization is
accompanied by enforceable investor protection, its beneﬁts for ﬁrm per-
formance will be limited because of severe agency problems, including var-
ious forms of expropriation or “tunneling” by management.
The evidence that legal rules matter is overwhelming. Protection of mi-
nority shareholders is weaker in countries with a civil law tradition. In
many countries, the judiciary cannot be counted on to enforce contracts
between investors and ﬁrms. Countries with less protection for minority
shareholders have smaller equity markets, other things equal (La Porta et
al. 1997a). Firms in countries with less investor protection use less outside
ﬁnance (La Porta et al. 1997a) and have higher debt-equity ratios, making
them more vulnerable to collapse (Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton 2003).
Countries and companies with weak corporate governance can also suﬀer
larger collapses when hit by adverse shocks (Johnson, Boone, et al. 2000;
Mitton 2002; Lemmon and Lins 2003). Countries with weaker institutions
have experienced greater output volatility over the past forty years (Thai-
charoen 2001) and have suﬀered larger exchange rate crises (Pivovarsky
and Thaicharoen 2001).
Other domestic institutions can adapt to some extent, but not enough to
oﬀset weak legal protection. The government has only limited ability to act
directly to compensate for weak investor protection. Private companies in
civil-law countries have developed various mechanisms to improve their
investor relations, but these mechanisms are far from perfect. In many
civil-law countries there are signiﬁcant loopholes through which value can
be tunneled legally out of a company (Johnson, La Porta, et al. 2000). An
Privatization and Corporate Governance 15important complement of eﬀective privatization is the eﬀective legal pro-
tection of investors.
Laws and other institutions providing investor protection are persistent
and hard to change. But this does not mean that legal reform is ineﬀective.
Among countries with relatively weak legal systems, the evidence indicates
that strong stock market regulation can to a large degree act as an eﬀective
substitute for judicial enforcement of contracts (Glaeser, Johnson, and
Shleifer 2001). Poland provides a clear example of conditions under which
a strong, independent stock-market regulator can create a well-
functioning stock market, despite a weak judiciary. In all the success cases
of capital market development and privatization through public sale of
shares, good legal rules are of paramount importance.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997b) review the literature on corporate gover-
nance before the recent wave of ﬁndings from comparative research. La
Porta et al. (2000b) describe the ﬁrst wave of this research, which consti-
tutes about twenty papers written through the early fall of 1999. However,
the pace of activity in this area is accelerating. We cover about thirty new
papers not included in either of these previous surveys.
Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 review the evidence against each of the Coasian
positions, with particular emphasis on recent experience with privatiza-
tion. Section 1.5 reports recent theoretical analysis based on this evidence.
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Law Matters
The strongest Coasian position is that law does not matter. If this were
true, we should expect to see no signiﬁcant correlation between legal rules
and economic outcomes around the world. The evidence decisively rejects
this hypothesis.
1.2.1 Investor Protection
The new literature on the importance of law begins with La Porta et al.
(1998), who show there are systematic diﬀerences in the legal rights of in-
vestors across countries. An important explanatory factor of these diﬀer-
ences is the origin of the legal system.
La Porta et al. (1998) propose six dimensions to evaluate the extent of
protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by the insiders,
as captured by a commercial code (or company law). First, the rules in
some countries allow proxy voting by mail, which makes it easier for mi-
nority shareholders to exercise their voting rights. Second, the law in some
countries blocks the shares for a period prior to a general meeting of share-
holders, which makes it harder for shareholders to vote. Third, the law in
some countries allows some type of cumulative voting, which makes it
easier for a group of minority shareholders to elect at least one director of
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which gives the minority shareholders who feel oppressed by the board the
right to sue or otherwise get relief from the board’s decision. In the United
States, this oppressed minority mechanism takes the very eﬀective form of
a class action suit, but in other countries there are other ways to petition
the company or the courts with a complaint. Fifth, in some countries, the
law gives minority shareholders a preemptive right to new issues, which
protects them from dilution by the controlling shareholders who could
otherwise issue new shares to themselves or to friendly parties. Sixth, the
law in some countries requires relatively few shares to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting, at which the board can presumably be challenged or
even replaced, whereas in other cases a large equity stake is needed for that
purpose. La Porta et al. (1998) aggregate these six dimensions of share-
holder protection into an anti–director rights index by simply adding a 1
when the law is protective along one of the dimensions and a 0 when it is
not.
The highest shareholder-rights score in the La Porta et al. (1998) sample
of forty-nine countries is 5. Investor protection is signiﬁcantly higher in
common-law countries, with an average score of 4, compared with French-
origin civil-law countries, with an average score of 2.33. There is signiﬁcant
variation within legal origin, however. In the La Porta et al. data, there is
no association between a country’s level of economic development and its
anti–director rights score, but a strong association between the score and
the size of its stock market relative to gross national product (GNP).
La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) also ﬁnd that the legal enforcement of con-
tracts is weaker in countries with a civil-law tradition. For example, the
eﬃciency of the judicial system on average is 8.15 in English-origin coun-
tries (on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 means more eﬃcient), but only 6.56 in
French-origin countries. Legal origin therefore aﬀects investor protection
both through the rights available in the laws and the ease of enforcement of
these rights.
Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) look in more detail at Poland and
the Czech Republic, which were not included in the original La Porta et al.
(1998) sample. They ﬁnd that the Polish commercial code protected in-
vestors more than did the Czech code, but the most important diﬀerence
was in the design and implementation of securities law. As Pistor (1995),
Coﬀee (1999a), and Black (2000) also argue, protection under the com-
mercial code is complementary to protection under securities law.
Slavova (1999) extends the La Porta et al. (1998) work to twenty-one
formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Rather than looking directly at the laws, she uses a survey to ask lo-
cal legal professionals what speciﬁc rules are in place and how they are en-
forced. Her work conﬁrms the analysis of La Porta et al. on the general re-
lationship between shareholder protection and stock market development
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Poland and the Czech Republic. For postcommunist countries, privatiza-
tion has proved much more eﬀective where capital markets have also de-
veloped at least to some extent.
Recent research has focused on some additional determinants of inves-
tor protection (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Roe 2000, 2003; Stulz and William-
son 2003). Rajan and Zingales (2003) maintain that there is an important
underlying political process. Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) argue
that the way in which legal systems were transplanted to other countries is
more important than legal origin. However, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2001) conﬁrm that legal origin has explanatory power with respect to
current institutions. They ﬁnd that additional explanatory power lies with
the way in which countries were colonized, and particularly whether the
disease environment favored early settlers, but legal origin remains im-
portant. Using the pattern of colonization to generate a set of plausible in-
strumental variables, they show that institutions have a major impact on
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita today (see also Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson 2002).
1.2.2 Outcomes
Measures of investor protection matter for economic outcomes. There is
a direct eﬀect of investor protection on the development of external capi-
tal markets. Both stock markets and debt markets are less developed in
French origin countries (La Porta et al. 1997a). This is evident both in out-
side capitalization (measured as market capitalization owned by outsiders
relative to GNP), domestic listed ﬁrms per capita, and initial public oﬀer-
ings per capita. For a sample of the largest ﬁrms in each country in 1996,
La Porta et al. (1997a) ﬁnd that French legal origin countries have signiﬁ-
cantly lower market capitalization relative to sales and to cash ﬂow.
Subsequent work has found that lower stock market development can
reduce growth (Levine and Zervos 1998), that ﬁnancial development is
correlated with growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000), and that the
availability of external ﬁnance determines whether a country can develop
capital-intensive sectors (Rajan and Zingales 1998a). Wurgler (2000) ﬁnds
there is a better allocation of capital to industries in countries with more
ﬁnancial development.
Countries with weaker investor protection suﬀer more adverse conse-
quences when hit by a shock. Johnson, Boone, et al. (2000) present evi-
dence that the weakness of legal institutions for corporate governance had
an adverse eﬀect on the extent of depreciations and stock market declines
in the Asian crisis. Corporate governance provides at least as convincing
an explanation for the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock mar-
ket decline as any or all of the usual macroeconomic arguments. These
results hold more generally for exchange rate crises and output volatility
18 Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleiferover the past forty years (Pivovarsky and Thaicharoen 2001; Thaicharoen
2001).
Firm-level evidence supports this view. Mitton (2002) looks at ﬁve Asian
countries most aﬀected by the 1997–1998 crisis, and ﬁnds that ﬁrms with
larger inside ownership and less transparent accounting suﬀered larger
falls in stock price. He also ﬁnds that more diversiﬁed ﬁrms suﬀer a greater
fall, particularly if they have more uneven investment opportunities (mea-
sured in terms of Tobin’s Q). This is consistent with, although it does not
prove, the view that ﬁrms with weaker corporate governance faced a larger
loss of investor conﬁdence. It may also be the case that more diversiﬁed
ﬁrms are less able to allocate investment properly due to internal politics,
as suggested by Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and that these political prob-
lems become worse in a downturn.
Nalbantoglu and Savasoglu (2000) ﬁnd similar results for Turkey in the
late 1990s. Lemmon and Lins (2003) conﬁrm Mitton’s (2002) ﬁndings us-
ing the separation of control and cash-ﬂow rights to measure the extent of
agency problems. Firms in which controlling shareholders had less cash-
ﬂow rights suﬀered larger stock price declines in the Asian crisis. Over
longer periods of time, Lins and Servaes (2002) also ﬁnd a discount for di-
versiﬁed ﬁrms in seven emerging markets. Claessens et al. (2003) ﬁnd a di-
versiﬁcation discount for East Asian ﬁrms and worse performance for con-
glomerates during the East Asian crisis.
1.3 Other Institutions
The second Coasian view is that even if legal rules matter and are weak
in some countries, other governmental or private institutions should adapt
to protect investors. The political process or even private negotiation be-
tween ﬁrms and investors can deliver investor protection. Three main
mechanisms have been suggested.
First, the government may put pressure on ﬁrms to treat investors prop-
erly, even though the law does not require it. If ﬁrms expropriate investors,
they can lose other rights, such as favorable tax treatment or even the right
to operate. This is the argument made by Berglof and von Thadden (1999)
for many European countries. The government could try to ensure that
ﬁrms behave by directly owning and running banks. In fact, government
ownership of banks is signiﬁcantly higher in French-origin legal systems
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).
This approach requires an honest and eﬀective government, but this is it-
self an endogenous outcome. La Porta et al. (1999) show that countries
with a civil-law tradition are likely to have higher corruption and less eﬀec-
tive government administration. Governments may also say that they want
to protect investors, but in a sharp downturn ﬁnd that they would rather
protect entrepreneurs. This is one interpretation of what happened re-
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ton 2003).
Second, ownership may develop in a diﬀerent way from the United States
and the United Kingdom. In particular, concentrated outside ownership
may allow more eﬀective control over management. In fact, most civil-law
countries have concentrated ownership. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (1999) show that groups of connected ﬁrms are much more usual
than stand-alone ﬁrms in most countries. These groups typically include at
least one company that is publicly traded or otherwise raises funds from
outside investors, as well as a number of additional companies that are
completely privately held. Some valuable assets are usually kept private.
This type of organization is particularly common in emerging markets
where the legal protection of minority shareholder rights and creditors is
weaker (La Porta et al. 1998). With the exception of Chile, the Latin Amer-
ican countries for which data are available have higher than average own-
ership concentration (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1998). Concentrated
ownership also plays an important role in some European countries. For
example, Gorton and Schmid (2000) ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more highly valued
when large shareholders own more shares in Germany. In eighteen emerg-
ing markets, Lins (2003) ﬁnds that large blockholders generally increase
ﬁrm value.
The trouble with this approach is that there are still small minority
shareholders in most countries with stock markets (see the data in table 2
from La Porta et al. 1997a). If large shareholders actually control manage-
ment, small shareholders are not protected from expropriation. In fact,
what happened in the Czech Republic over the past decade suggests that in
an environment of weak legal protection, it is easy to gain control over a
privatized ﬁrm and then strip it of value (Coﬀee 1999b; Glaeser, Johnson,
and Shleifer 2001). Hellwig (2000) explains clearly the deﬁciencies of pro-
tection for small shareholders in Germany and Switzerland.
Third, there may be some reputation building by ﬁrms. For example, by
paying higher dividends, companies in civil-law countries could establish a
reputation for treating shareholders properly. In principle, repeated interac-
tion between managers and shareholders could establish that management
can be trusted, and this should increase their ability to raise more capital.
Theoretically, this argument has an important weakness. Managers may
be happy to treat shareholders well when the economy is growing fast, but
this does not imply anything about how they will be treated in a downturn
(Johnson, Boone et al. 2000). It is very easy to expropriate shareholders for
a few years and then return to the capital markets. Not surprisingly, the
empirical evidence does not support the view that there is more reputation
building through dividend policy in civil-law countries. In fact, La Porta et
al. (2000a) show that companies in common-law countries pay higher div-
idends.
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Coﬀee (1999a) argues that there is an important movement toward
“functional convergence,” through which ﬁrms around the world are
adopting U.S.-type mechanisms to protect investors. There is certainly a
move toward issuing ADRs, and these seem to improve access to external
capital markets. Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2002) show that the sensi-
tivity of investment to cash ﬂow falls when an ADR is issued by a company
from a country with a weak legal system and a less developed capital mar-
ket (as deﬁned by La Porta et al. 1997a). Reese and Weisbach (2002) show
that companies in civil-law countries are more likely to list ADRs on an or-
ganized exchange in the United States, thus committing themselves to
greater disclosure. All of this work supports the third Coasian view, that in-
ternational contracts can get around some of the deﬁciencies of domestic
investor protection. The implication is that while law may matter and do-
mestic institutions cannot adapt, domestic legal reform is inessential.
The trouble is that ADRs may help companies opt into a regime of
greater disclosure, but they do not stop expropriation as long as it is dis-
closed. The substitutes for the law thus do not work perfectly. For example,
privatized Italian companies over the past decade have often issued ADRs,
but there is an active debate about whether this has proved eﬀective. ADRs
have had at best limited positive eﬀects for Mexican ﬁrms in the 1990s
(Siegel 2002).
There are important processes of legal reform at work in many countries,
and the evidence suggests that some of these eﬀorts have important eﬀects
on investor protection and the ﬁnancing of ﬁrms. In countries with weak
legal systems, the expropriation of outside investors takes place through
relatively open forms of outright theft, transfer pricing, related lending,
failure to disclose relevant information when issuing securities, and failure
to report earnings properly. What can prevent this when the courts are
weak? Recent work suggests that in such ﬁnancial markets a strong regu-
lator can protect the property rights of outside investors and thereby im-
prove welfare. This may be particularly important where privatization is
being attempted.
The idea of focusing the regulation of securities markets on intermedi-
aries is sometimes credited to James Landis, a contributor to the 1933 and
1934 Securities Acts in the United States (McCraw 1984). Landis reasoned
that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission by itself could monitor
neither the compliance with disclosure, reporting, and other rules by all
listed ﬁrms; nor the trading practices of all market participants. Rather, the
commission would regulate intermediaries, such as the brokers, the ac-
counting ﬁrms, the investment advisors, and so on, who would in turn at-
tempt to assure compliance with regulatory requirements by the issuers
and the traders. Moreover, by maintaining substantial power over the in-
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to issue and revoke licenses, the commission could force them to monitor
market participants.
Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) ﬁnd that the stringent—and strin-
gently enforced—regulations in Poland, expressed in both company and
securities laws, have stimulated rapid development of securities markets
and enabled a large number of new ﬁrms to go public. It has also greatly fa-
cilitated the privatization of state-owned ﬁrms. The expropriation of in-
vestors has been relatively modest, and the qualitative evaluations of the
Polish market have been very positive as well. In contrast, the lax—and
laxly enforced—regulations in the Czech Republic have been associated
with the stagnation of markets, the delisting of hundreds of privatized com-
panies from the stock exchange, and no listing of new private companies.
The expropriation of investors has apparently been rampant, and has ac-
quired a new Czech-speciﬁc name: tunneling. Consistent with these con-
cerns, the qualitative assessments of the Czech market have been poor.
Starting in 1996, the Czech Republic has sharply tightened its regulations.
These ﬁndings suggest that even countries with relatively weak legal sys-
tems can improve the protection of investors, and that this improvement
will help ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnance.
Poland also demonstrates the value of regulating intermediaries, partic-
ularly investment funds and brokers. When these organizations are tightly
regulated, it is possible to suspend or revoke their licenses for inappropri-
ate actions. These intermediaries then have a strong interest in ensuring
both internal compliance and external vigilance. It is helpful that everyone
involved with the securities market watch out for the misbehavior of others.
1.5 Theory
The Coasian argument seems extremely powerful. Why does it fail? How
does this aﬀect standard models of ﬁnance? What is the right way to model
ﬁrms in countries with weak legal institutions?
1.5.1 Law and Regulation
The Coasian argument, in all three versions reviewed here, relies on the
crucial assumption that the judiciary is able to enforce both existing prop-
erty rights and the eﬃciency-enhancing contracts. But what if the courts
are not eﬃcient enough to perform this role, because they are under-
ﬁnanced, unmotivated, unfamiliar with the economic issues, or even cor-
rupt? At the least, it may then be necessary to provide a detailed legal
framework to facilitate the work of the courts. In some cases, it may be nec-
essary to go further and create a regulatory framework, which empowers a
regulator to provide and enforce rules that promote more eﬃcient out-
comes. This case for regulation is stronger when the government is more in-
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Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) discuss the
incentives to enforce alternative laws and regulations more generally.
It is quite possible for a country to get stuck in an equilibrium with weak
law enforcement. For example, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997)
argue that many countries in the former Soviet Union drove ﬁrms under-
ground with high taxation, corruption, and regulation. This undermined
the tax base of the government and made it harder to provide reasonable
rule of law. Without rule of law, there is much less incentive to become a
registered ﬁrm and pay taxes. Thus most of the former Soviet Union, but
not the better parts of Eastern Europe, is trapped with weak law enforce-
ment, a large unoﬃcial economy, and a low tax base. In this environment,
it proved diﬃcult to privatize without creating widespread possibilities for
tunneling.
1.5.2 Tunneling, Propping, and Debt
While the evidence reviewed above suggests that expropriation of share-
holders is endemic, it is not the case that there is a zero cost of stealing in
most countries. In fact, we need to understand how standard ﬁnance re-
sults are modiﬁed as the cost of stealing varies.
The original model of expropriation by managers is Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976). Burkhart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) introduce the assump-
tion that most diversion by management is costly, because (for example) it
involves legal maneuvers. La Porta et al. (2002) show how to think about
the cost of stealing across countries in a simple static framework. This ap-
proach has been developed further by Johnson, Boone, et al. (2000) and
more recently by Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) and Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002).
Johnson, Boone, et al. (2000) present a new theoretical explanation for
the eﬀects of corporate governance on macroeconomic outcomes. If steal-
ing by managers increases when the expected rate of return on investment
falls, then an adverse shock to investor conﬁdence leads to increased theft
and to lower capital inﬂow and greater attempted capital outﬂow for a
country. These, in turn, translate into lower stock prices and a depreciated
exchange rate.
The model in Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) puts ideas from
Jensen (1986), Myers (1977), and La Porta et al. (2002) into a dynamic set-
ting. The key assumption is that entrepreneurs not only can take from the
ﬁrm, but they can also give. There is substantial evidence that in moments
of crisis, entrepreneurs in some legal systems prop up their ﬁrms in order
to keep them going (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991; Kim 2003).
Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) ﬁnd that some debt ﬁnance is
generally optimal because it reduces theft and induces propping in some
states of the world. Thus debt can serve the role proposed by Jensen (1986)
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eﬀectively no collateral). However, in other states of the world, a debt over-
hang may induce entrepreneurs to loot the company. Thus there can de-
velop an overhang of debt with the negative consequences analyzed by
Myers (1977). When the legal system is weaker, Friedman, Johnson, and
Mitton show that the debt-equity ratio will usually be higher, even though
this increases the probability that the ﬁrm will collapse. In weaker legal sys-
tems, entrepreneurs also make investments that increase the cost of rene-
gotiation, because this raises the cost of defaulting on a loan and thus in-
creases the feasible amount of debt.
In this model, weaker legal institutions lead to the ﬁnancing of fewer
projects. But weak legal institutions can also contribute to economic crises.
Weak protection of investor rights does not make shocks more likely, but
it does mean that negative shocks have larger eﬀects on the overall econ-
omy. Institutions matter for a particular aspect of volatility—whether
countries can suﬀer large collapses (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Reasonable cap-
ital structures in a weak legal environment can lead to a bimodal distribu-
tion of outcomes.
The data are broadly supportive. Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003)
show that Asian ﬁrms with weaker corporate governance were more highly
indebted before the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998. Kim and Stone (1999)
ﬁnd that countries with more corporate debt suﬀered larger falls in output
during the Asian crisis of 1997–1998. Other work suggests both that ag-
gregate corporate debt is higher in countries with weaker corporate gover-
nance (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999) and that it was higher
within Asian countries for ﬁrms with weaker corporate governance. Lee,
Lee, and Lee (2001), for example, demonstrate that corporate leverage was
higher for chaebolcompanies than for non-chaebol, and highest for the top
few chaebol.
More work is needed to link the debt ﬁndings more precisely to corpo-
rate governance and macroeconomic outcomes. Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (1999) is one early attempt to formalize these ideas, emphasizing
implications of underinvestment in appropriate collateral that occurs due
to legal problems in some countries.
This research is part of a broader movement looking at the macroeco-
nomic implications of institutions. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) argue
that labor market institutions in Western Europe were appropriate, but
could not handle the shocks they received in the 1970s and 1980s. In this
view a functional set of institutions became dysfunctional because of a par-
ticular set of shocks. More generally, Blanchard argues that macroeco-
nomic dynamics may depend on institutional structures: “Institutions also
matter for short-run ﬂuctuations, with diﬀerent mechanisms across coun-
tries....  I d e ntifying the role of diﬀerences in institutions in generating
24 Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleiferdiﬀerences in macroeconomic short- and medium-run evolutions is likely
to be an important topic of research in the future (2000, p. 1404).
1.6 Conclusions
A great deal of research suggests that privatization can be helpful for
economic development. But the eﬀectiveness of privatization is greater
when corporate governance works well. This paper has reviewed recent ev-
idence showing that eﬀective laws are an important requirement for cor-
porate governance. Without enforceable investor protection, privatization
is less likely to succeed.
Law deﬁnitely matters. Countries with better investor protection have
better developed ﬁnancial markets and more growth. The determinants of
law are complex, but the origin of the legal system is an important factor.
Legal origin is not destiny. Laws can be changed and other institutions
can adapt to some extent. Civil-law European countries have become rich
with more government ownership and more concentrated ownership than
is seen in common-law countries. But it is a fallacy to infer that compen-
sating institutions fully compensate for the shortcomings of the law.
Legal reform works. Countries as diverse as Chile, Germany, Poland,
and South Korea have all made progress recently with changing the rules
for investor protection. There are many diﬀerent ways to change the rules,
and the required changes vary by country. But investor protection is ad-
vancing in many countries, precisely because people have learned that it
matters for economic development.
We are not arguing that all countries could or should become just like the
United States. But in important dimensions we see countries around the
world adopting investor protection measures that are modeled on U.S. law.
The evidence suggests that when these measures are implemented in an en-
forceable way, they can change both the extent of investor protection and
the ability of ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnance. Properly designed U.S.-type
innovations can work even in countries with quite diﬀerent legal origins,
such as Germany and Poland.
Of course, conﬁdence in the United States has been shaken recently by
corporate scandals, particularly concerning accounting issues. But, at least
so far, there have been only four major scandals: Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
and Adelphia, and the U.S. regulatory system is responding (see Coﬀee
2003). It is important not to exaggerate the dimensions of the U.S. prob-
lems with corporate governance. At the same time, we do not think that the
United States has ideal or even best practices on all dimensions of ac-
counting, regulations, and corporate governance. There is clearly a need
for the reforms now underway (and perhaps more).
By giving us a clear framework to think about contracts, Ronald Coase
Privatization and Corporate Governance 25shed a great deal of light on many issues, including comparative corporate
governance and privatization. It is an indication of the power of his ap-
proach, that research is now advancing by trying to augment Coasian ar-
guments about how ﬁrms are ﬁnanced around the world. The Coasian idea
that private contracts can attain eﬃcient outcomes is powerful and in many
instances correct. The right question is how to make it easier for the private
sector to write its own eﬃcient contracts. In many cases, this can be
achieved only through changing the broader legal rules that underpin cap-
ital and other markets.
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Comment Cassey Lee Hong Kim
The early literature in privatization focused on the importance of private
ownership for eﬃciency as well the role of competition in soliciting behav-
ior that would beneﬁt consumers. In the past few years, the emphasis in the
privatization literature has shifted to the issue of corporate governance.
What brought about this change? Were private ownership and competition
themselves insuﬃcient to ensure that the full beneﬁts of privatization will
materialize? The gap that corporate governance ﬁlls in the privatization lit-
erature can be seen from ﬁgure 1C.1.
Private ownership provides incentives for ﬁrms to operate eﬃciently
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Malaya.while competition ensures that such eﬃciency gains are passed on to the
consumers. Corporate governance looks at the missing link between in-
vestors (suppliers of ﬁnance) and those who control the ﬁrms (manage-
ment). More speciﬁcally, it addresses the question of how investors can get
a return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Will this come
about “naturally” (emerge spontaneously) or do we need to enact eﬀective
laws that protect investors?
Johnson and Shleifer attribute to Coase (1960) the idea that private con-
tracts can be written between investors and managers such that the for-
mer’s interests are safeguarded. In their paper, Johnson and Shleifer argue
that, contrary to Coase, law matters. The authors also review the evidence
against two weaker variants of the Coase argument. The ﬁrst variant in-
volves the emergence of spontaneous actions by governments or private
institutions (e.g., concentrated shareholders) to protect the interests of
investors in the presence of weak legal rules. The second variant goes one
step further by postulating the emergence of capital markets outside the
country with weak legal system to overcome this problem.
Coase I
Johnson and Shleifer marshal a wide range of empirical evidence in-
volving many diﬀerent levels of analysis to support their argument that law
matters (ﬁg. 1C.2). The strongest evidence comes from country case stud-
ies involving Poland and the Czech Republic (Glaeser, Johnson, and
Shleifer 2001) that directly attempt to link stock market development to le-
gal institutions that protect investors. The authors also cite numerous pa-
pers by La Porta et al. that found relationships between legal traditions and
legal institutions for investor protection, and between legal institutions
and economic performance. Compared to all these areas, the least devel-
oped area is the evolution of legal traditions (Glaeser and Shleifer 2000 is
an example). It is not very clear from the literature why private contracts
cannot be written to solve principal-agent problem under corporate gov-
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Fig. 1C.1 Agents and institutions in privatizationernance. Is it simply because the Coasian assumption about zero transac-
tions cost does not exist? Or is something more fundamental happening
here?
It is plausible that there are circumstances where the gains that a man-
ager can obtain from an action that works against the owner’s interest ex-
ceed any amount the latter can compensate the former. A private contract
between such parties can of course involve some form of agreed-upon pun-
ishment. But there are limits to such punishment without infringing on a
person’s fundamental rights. Severe punishments such as imprisonment
can only be enforced in the realm of the law and not private contracts. In
this sense, it is not just that law matters, but rather that law complements
private contracts. For matters of a smaller scale, such as a ﬁrm’s quarterly
performance, contracts are still eﬀective.
Coase II
What if law matters, as Johnson and Shleifer argue, but is too weak in a
given country? Can institutions—both public and private—overcome this
by taking over the ﬁnancing and management of corporations? The ﬁrst
option is tantamount to renationalization—an action that fundamentally
transforms the objective of the ﬁrm from a proﬁt-oriented to a public or
politically oriented one. Once this is done, we are back where we started:
namely, the preprivatization situation. Hence, the problem with this is not
(as Johnson and Shleifer argue) that the state—the new owner—may not
be honest or eﬀective but rather that it has a diﬀerent objective from private
institutions. Very often, renationalization of privatized entities is under-
taken to avoid political fallout. One way to look at this problem is to apply
Coase’s (1937) theory of the ﬁrm to the state. As long as private ownership
best serves the state’s objective, it is upheld. Otherwise, the boundary of the
state is re-enlarged by renationalizing the ﬁrm, perhaps at least until the le-
gal institutions pertaining to corporate governance are strengthened.1 To
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Fig. 1C.2 How law matters in corporate governance
1. There are other problems when this occurs. When privatization exercises are accompa-
nied by liberalization via market entry, renationalization of the incumbent poses considerable
regulatory problems.further complicate matters, the evolution of such institutions is, as Johnson
and Shleifer put it, “an endogenous outcome” (albeit in a diﬀerent con-
text).
In the second option, when the legal rules are weak, private institutions
can take over the management of the ﬁrm, possibly via concentrated own-
ership. The empirical evidence that Johnson and Shleifer discuss is intrigu-
ing. For example, they allude to the importance of relationship-based
(bank) ﬁnancing. It is not clear, however, whether relationship-based ﬁ-
nancing is an adaptation to weak investor protection by legal institutions
or whether this is inferior to the Anglo-Saxon, arm’s-length type of equity
ﬁnancing. Finally, the authors highlight interesting evidence on the impact
of large shareholding. Firms are more highly valued when large share-
holders own more shares in Germany (and emerging markets), while large
shareholders can lead to expropriation at the expense of small holders in
the Czech Republic. Do these ﬁndings contradict each other, or does it
mean large shareholding is beneﬁcial only if some form of protection is ac-
corded to minority shareholders?
Coase III
The problem of weak domestic-investor protection is overcome in the
third Coasian argument through bypasses via sourcing funds in interna-
tional markets. In other words, there is no need to improve domestic in-
vestor protection since ﬁrms can source funds from outside the domestic
capital markets. Is this second-best, and is constrained eﬃciency achieved?
Johnson and Shleifer give the impression that there is very little empirical
work that addresses these questions. Instead, the authors argue that legal
reforms are beneﬁcial. One such reform—for countries with strong legal
systems (the Neuer Markt)—involves the formation of a new segment of
the capital market for start-ups with higher degrees of investor protection.
This could be perceived as supporting the third Coasian argument if the
argument is construed as involving external contracts rather than interna-
tional contracts. After all, markets such as the Neuer Markt appear to have
an “enclave” characteristic (i.e., a diﬀerent set of rules seems to apply). For
countries with weak legal systems, Johnson and Shleifer propose a diﬀer-
ent type of reform that focuses on regulating ﬁnancial intermediaries. The
eﬀectiveness of this will, of course, depend on whether the political system
is conducive to the establishment of an independent and eﬀective regula-
tor. In this regard, the political economy of corporate governance reform
seems to be the next important research agenda.
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Comment Richard H. Snape
Many of us would agree with Johnson and Shleifer that the 1990s have
shown that institutions do matter, as do transaction and agency costs; that
vacuums are not necessarily ﬁlled by socially useful activities; that govern-
ments do not necessarily pursue the general good; and that they are often
weak and captive. Legal systems matter.
A great deal of recent research work is drawn upon in this paper. Eﬃ-
ciently operating capital markets matter for development and even if eﬃ-
cient institutions may develop endogenously in the long term, a great deal
may be wasted in the meantime. But, it is suggested, countries can be stuck
in an equilibrium of weak law enforcement, a large unoﬃcial (gray) econ-
omy, and a low tax base. Such an economy is very diﬃcult to privatize with-
out “tunneling,” which does not just have distributional eﬀects, but eﬃ-
ciency and development eﬀects also.
If legal systems are weak, how does one move to give conﬁdence to in-
vestors—particularly small investors? There is an endorsement of Poland
compared with the Czech Republic, for example—a strong and indepen-
dent regulator of the stock market, despite a weak judiciary. The stock
market is not the only institution, of course. There is a case for regulation
and prudential requirements on a whole range of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
These intermediaries can be large enough to monitor those in whom they
invest, but they in turn need to be monitored and, if necessary, disciplined.
Of course, we quickly hit the problem of who regulates or monitors the
regulators.
We can specify good principles of regulation, but how can they be legis-
lated or enforced if the government is weak, populist, complicit, or even
corrupt?
What perhaps could be developed further in the paper is an examination
of how to move to better regulation. There are two questions:
1. What are good principles for regulation?
2. How do we introduce them?
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and South Korea—but there is more to be pursued here. We can hardly ex-
pect civil-law countries to change their legal systems without revolution
(and, incidentally, Malaysia is not a civil-law country). Perhaps we can take
some lessons from trade policy.
Why did countries move from inward-looking to outwardly oriented
policies? Partly from empirical evidence, partly from change in develop-
ment theory; partly from external pressures (from the International Mon-
etary Fund or the World Bank); partly from crises. Governments were also
required to stand up to protected interests, and this of course is the critical
factor.
The important literature drawn upon in the paper is part of the empiri-
cal work that can facilitate the change. It can be compared with work by
Anne Krueger and others in the 1970s and 1980s in the trade policy area.
Crises can help, and the Asian ﬁnancial crises have brought the lesson
home to some. But as was mentioned by Mari Pangestu, we need the sub-
stance of good regulation and not just institutions with ﬁne-sounding
names. Moreover, we cannot develop appropriate institutions, including
institutions to regulate, without developing a framework for acceptance of
them. Knowing the right rules is one thing; knowing how to introduce
them is another.
Public education is crucial in getting the framework to introduced good
regulation for corporate governance as well as good trade policy.
Why did trade policy change in Australia?
There was education, measurement of costs of protection, a perceived
crisis, and a government that took an economy-wide perspective—and a
parliamentary opposition that did not oppose the changes. But populism
is always present and education is an ongoing requirement.
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